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I. INTRODUCTION

Section 810.145 of the Florida Statutes was enacted to protect
Floridians from unconsented video recordings of their person's body.'3
But since its enactment in 2004,2 and a subsequent amendment in 2008,
Florida's courts have remained silent on what the statute means in
application. 4 Although the Supreme Court of Florida has provided
standard jury instructions to help courts and juries understand the
statute, 5 the advent of small and portable hand-held video recording
devices has increased the need for the enforcement of this statute.
This Note shall provide a detailed discussion from the prospective of
a fictional adult woman named Alice. 6 As part of her journey, the first
part of this Note demonstrates how Alice becomes a victim of the
criminal behavior this statute was intended to protect against, and how
Florida's Police Department typically responds to this problem. The
second part of this Note discusses the statute itself, the words and their
meaning, how consent plays a fundamental role in the statute, the
legislative intent in creating the statutes, and how Florida's courts are
most likely to apply the statute, including the second half of the statute
criminalizing dissemination of unconsented to video recordings of a
person's body and how dissemination may interact with the First
Amendment. The third part of this Note returns to Alice's problem,
explaining how cruel results affect the unknowing victim, how
educating the public can help protect victims like Alice, and how
technology will increase the challenges of Florida's law enforcement. In
essence, this statute was created to protect Floridians from the criminal
behavior associated with Video Voyeurism and should be enforced to
its fullest extent to ensure continued privacy for Floridians and our
guests.
II. ALICE'S JOURNEY
"Alice had not a moment to think about stopping herself before she

1. FLA. STAT. § 810.145(2) (2011).
2. Act effective May 12, 2004, ch. 2004-39, 2004 Fla. Laws 39.
3. Act effective June 17, 2008, ch. 2008-188, 2008 Fla. Laws 188.
4. But see In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2007-5, 982
So. 2d 1160, 1163-69 (Fla. 2008).
5. Id.
6. Many of the names in this Note are modeled after Lewis Carroll's fantastic adventure
entitled Alice's Adventures in Wonderland. See LEWIS CARROLL, THE ANNOTATED ALICE

(Definitive ed., W.W. Norton & Co. 2000) (1865). Brief explanations of why the quotes were
selected will provide glimpses into our heroine Alice's "adventure" in Florida.
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found herself falling down what seemed to be a very deep well."

105

7

A. The Beginning
Imagine this. You open the door to your home shortly after hearing a
friendly knock. A friend hands you a DVD and says gravely, "You have
to see this ..... After putting the DVD in your player, you find yourself
staring at a video recording of you having consensual sex with a person
at his or her home. You had no idea that your sexual encounter had been
recorded. Worse yet, you have no idea how your friend got a copy of
this on a DVD. Staring in horror, you notice that the person you are
having sex with occasionally winks towards the camera, nuances you
did not realize during your consensual sex.
B. Drink This: Notifying the Police Department
Notifying the police department about a crime committed against
you, especially a crime where you, as the victim, feel some kind of
shame, is never easy. The funny thing in this tragic series of events is
that you are one of the lucky ones. That's right, you actually discovered
a person who did this to you. Most victims of this crime have no idea
that the crime has even happened. They live the rest of their lives
blissfully unaware of the secret recordings that may have been taken by
the video voyeur. This ranges from images taken in public through acts
such as up skirt photography, to other images taken in the reasonably
expected privacy of restrooms, fitting rooms, changing rooms, dressing
rooms, locker rooms, and tanning booths. Each of these images is
unlikely to be discovered. Why? Because the image is made secretly by
the wrongdoer. Even though the knowledge and consent of the victim is
required for such viewing, because the victim is unaware of the image,
the criminal act of the wrongdoer rarely gets reported.
Hypothetically speaking, let us give a person, a supposed victim of
this crime, a name. We shall call her "Alice" and together we shall
discover this world that she stumbled into not because she was looking
for it, but because
8 she finds herself "falling down what seemed to be a
very deep well.",
Assuming that the present hypothetical actually happened to Alice,
at some point, she would need to approach the police department to
report the crime. The police department will likely be the department in
the county where the crime is reported. Shortly after discovering the
proper jurisdiction, she goes to the police department and begins her
journey wherein she says, "I would like to report a crime."
7.

Id. at 12.

8. Id.
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II. FLORIDA STATUTE § 810.145
"Alice was more and more puzzled, but she thought there was no use
in saying anything more till the Pigeon had finished." 9
Section 810.145 can be divided into four separate and distinct
parts. 10 The first part of the statute discusses the crime of "Video
Voyeurism" itself and demonstrates three different ways that the act of
video voyeurism can take place." The second part of the statute
discusses the crime of dissemination, for both commercial and personal
reasons, of a recording made under the first part of the statute and
12
defines it as a separate and distinct crime carrying its own sentence.
9. Id. at 55. For purpose of this hypothetical, the Pigeon represents the lofty voice of
reason up high. After all, Pigeon is a character Alice encounters when her head is in the clouds.
See id. at 54-56.
10. See FLA.STAT. § 810.145 (2011).
11. Section 810.145(2) of the Florida Statutes states:
(2)A person commits the offense of video voyeurism ifthat person:
(a)For his or her own amusement, entertainment, sexual arousal,
gratification, or profit, or for the purpose of degrading or abusing another
person, intentionally uses or installs an imaging device to secretly view,
broadcast, or record a person, without that person's knowledge and consent,
who is dressing, undressing, or privately exposing the body, at a place and
time when that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy;
(b) For the amusement, entertainment, sexual arousal, gratification, or profit
of another, or on behalf of another, intentionally permits the use or
installation of an imaging device to secretly view, broadcast, or record a
person without that person's knowledge and consent, who is dressing
undressing, or privately exposing the body, at a place and time when that
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy; or
(c) For the amusement, entertainment, sexual arousal, gratification, or profit
of oneself or another, or on behalf of oneself or another, intentionally uses
an imaging device to secretly view, broadcast, or record under or through
the clothing being worn by another person, without that person's knowledge
and consent, for the purpose of viewing the body of, or the undergarments
worn by, that person.
Id. § 810.145(2).
12. Section 810.145(3) of the Florida Statutes states:
(3) A person commits the offense of video voyeurism dissemination if that
person, knowing or having reason to believe that an image was created in a
manner described in this section, intentionally disseminates, distributes, or
transfers the image to another person for the purpose of amusement,
entertainment, sexual arousal, gratification, or profit, or for the purpose of
disregarding or abusing another person.
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The third part details whom is exempt from prosecution, or civil
liability, under the video voyeurism statute. 13 Added as an amendment
to the Florida Statutes on June 17, 2008,14 the fourth part of section
810.145 criminalizes similar behavior as it relates to minors; only the
criminal punishment is much more severe.15 Although section 810.145
Id. § 810.145(3). Whereas section 810.145(4) of the Florida Statutes discusses commercial
dissemination of the recorded contraband and defines the criminal behavior in the manner as
follows:
(4) A person commits the offense of commercial video voyeurism
dissemination if that person:
(a) Knowing or having reason to believe that an image was created in a
manner described in this section, sells the image for consideration to another
person; or
(b) Having created the image in a manner described in this section,
disseminates, distributes, or transfers the image to another person for that
person to sell the image to others.
Id. § 810.145(4).
13. Section 810.145(5) of the Florida Statutes states:
(5) This section does not apply to any:
(a) Law enforcement agency conducting surveillance for a law enforcement
0
purpose;
(b) Security system when a written notice is conspicuously posted on the
premises stating that a video surveillance system has been installed for the
purpose of security for the premises;
(c) Video surveillance device that is installed in such a manner that the
presence of the device is clearly and immediately obvious; or
(d) Dissemination, distribution, or transfer of images subject to this section
by a provider of an electronic communication service as defined in 18
U.S.C. [§] 2510(15), or a provider of a remote computing service as defined
in 18 U.S.C. [§] 2711(2). For purposes of this section, the exemptions to the
definition of "electronic communication" set forth in 18 U.S.C. [§1
2510(12)(a), (b), (c), and (d) do not apply, but are included within the
definition of the term.
Id. § 810.145(5).
14. Act effective June 17, 2008, id.ch. 2008-188, §§ 1-2.
15. Section 810.145(8) of the Florida Statutes states:
(8)(a) A person who is:
1. Eighteen years of age or older who is responsible for the welfare of a child
younger than 16 years of age, regardless of whether the person knows or has
reason to know the age of the child, and who commits an offense under this
section against that child;
2. Eighteen years of age or older who is employed at a private school... ; or a
voluntary prekindergarten education program... and who commits an offense
under this section against a student of the private school, school, or voluntary
prekindergarten education program; or
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provides language that gives courts some guidance as to what to do,
some terms require further explanation.
A. Words and Their Plain Meaning
"Who are you?" said the Caterpillar.
This was not an encouraging opening for a conversation.
Alice replied, rather shyly, "I-I hardly know, Sir, just at
present-at least I know who I was when I got up this morning,
but I think I must have been changed several times since then."
"What do you mean
by that?" said the Caterpillar, sternly.
'6
yourself!'
"Explain
1. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Where does a person have a reasonable expectation of privacy for
purpose of section 810.145 of the Florida Statutes? The legislators
provide language that can help. After all, the
"[p]lace and time when a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy" means a place and time when a reasonable person would
believe that he or she could fully disrobe in privacy, without
being concerned that the person's undressing [is] being viewed,
recorded, or broadcasted by another, including, but not limited to,
the interior of a bathroom,
changing room, fitting room, dressing
17
room, or tanning booth.
The legislature decided to define "reasonable expectation
of privacy"
18
because current voyeurism laws do not define this phrase.
Prior to 2002, few states had enacted legislation that target the

3. Twenty-four years of age or older who commits an offense under this section
against a child younger than 16 years of age, regardless of whether the person
knows or has reason to know the age of the child
commits a felony of the third degree.
Id. § 810.145(8).
16. CARROLL, supra note 6, at 47. When Alice first looked at herself in the recording, she
could not believe she was looking at herself. Standing outside of the picture made it look as

though it was someone else. This confusion is understandable given her surprise at what
happened. Expecting to share an intimate experience with someone in privacy and discovering

that the experience has been eternalized for anyone to see is not easy for anyone to process.
17. FLA. STAT. § 810.145(l)(c).
18. See id. § 810.14; Fla. S. Comm. on Judiciary, CS for SB 284 (2004) Staff Analysis 2
(Fourth rev. Apr. 6, 2004) [hereinafter Judiciary Comm. SB 284 Staff Analysis].
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19
specific criminal behavior of voyeurism, much less video voyeurism.
Those that have, explain that an expectation of privacy typically occurs
in private places such as bathrooms, restrooms, changing rooms, fitting
rooms, dressing rooms, and tanning booths.2 0 The central idea of
Florida's law is that if a person is disrobing, or his or her sexual organs
are subject to non-public view, then any images that may capture the
forbidden visage, absent knowledge and consent, should be subject to
criminal liability if the purpose of secretly recording these images is for
the "amusement, entertainment, sexual arousal, gratification, or profit of
another, or on behalf of another." 21 This purpose makes
22 this crime one
requiring a specific intent from the criminal defendant.
Some statutes focus on a place where a person expects privacy as
opposed to simply stating in any private place.23 An important
distinction is that anywhere a person expects privacy can include a
"public place" so long as the statutory language does not protect a

19. State v. Glas, 27 P.3d 216, 219 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 54
P.3d 147, 219 (Wash. 2002) (en banc).
20. See FLA. STAT. § 810.145(1)(c); IND. CODE § 35-45-4-5(a)(2) (2010); see also MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.539d(1)(a) (2010).
21. FLA. STAT. § 810.145(2).
22. Specific intent means "[t]he intent to accomplish the precise criminal act that one is
later charged with. - At common law, the specific-intent crimes were robbery, assault, larceny,
burglary, forgery, false pretenses, embezzlement, attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy. - Also
termed criminal intent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 882 (9th ed. 2009). Criminal intent "[o]ften
is used to include ... an actual intent to do the harmful deed." Id. at 881-82. For purposes of
this discussion, combining both the specific intent and criminal intent definitions shall be used
to describe the intent necessary for this crime. In other words, the intent required is "the intent to
accomplish the precise criminal act" where the person charged has "an actual intent to do the
harmful deed." Id. That intent includes having the secret motive to have the forbidden purpose.
See id.For purposes of defining the specific intent required, "secretly" can be manifested by
actively hiding the imaging device or, in the alternative, recording an image with the secret
purpose of not making the subject aware of the recording. See FLA. STAT. § 810.145(2).
23. Cf FLA. STAT. § 810.145(1)(c) ("[N]ot limited to the interior of a bathroom, changing
room, fitting room, dressing room, or tanning booth"); IND. CODE § 35-45-4-5 (2010)
("[I]ncluding restrooms, baths, showers, and dressing rooms"); WASH. REv. CODE § 9A.44.115
(2010).
"Place where [a person] would have a reasonable expectation of privacy"
means . . .[a] place where a reasonable person would believe that he or she
could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that his or her undressing
was being photographed or filmed by another or ...[a] place where one may
reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or
surveillance ....

Id.; MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 750.539d (2010) ("Install, place, or use in any private place, without
the consent of the person or persons entitled to privacy in that place, any device for observing,
recording, transmitting, photographing, or eavesdropping upon the sounds or events in that
place.").
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person in any private place.24 But what does "in any private place
mean?"

In jurisdictions like Michigan that use the words "in any private
place," the courts have interpreted the language by saying:
[T]o qualify as a privateplace [the area must be] protected from
surreptitious visual entry [and] . . . must be one in which a

reasonable person would expect not to be disturbed by the
appearance of another person or be subject to surveillance. The
area also
must not be one to which the general public has
25
access.

Michigan courts focus on the area and how the public perceives it,
not how the individual interprets the area that he or she is standing in at
the time.2 6 This matters a great deal for individuals recording persons in
public places.

Washington stumbled across this rather annoying problem shortly
after it enacted its statute for video voyeurism. In State v. Glas,27 the
Supreme Court of Washington determined that its video voyeurism
statute28 did not apply to two men who took pictures of women's sexual
24. See Glas, 54 P.3d at 150 (explaining that the term place should be interpreted as the
location where a person stands "in," not a private part on the person's body).
25. People v. Abate, 306 N.W.2d 476, 478 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (emphasis added); see
also MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.539a(1) ("'Private place' means a place where one may
reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or surveillance but does not include
a place to which the public or substantial group of the public has access."); Lewis v. LeGrow,
670 N.W.2d 675, 684 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). In Abate, the defendant installed a two way mirror
above a woman's restroom stall at a roller skating rink to see inside the restroom even when the
woman closed the door to the stall. 306 N.W.2d at 478. The court reasoned that even though the
restroom itself was open to the public, by closing the door to the stall, a reasonable person
would expect the area to be free of both surveillance and strangers entering the stall. Id. at 479.
Anyone that would stand over the partition, place their heads undemeath the partition, or
otherwise pierced the protection by placing their eyes up to the "hairline crack" would
effectively intrude the privacy of the person within the stall in a hostile manner. Id. Hostile
intrusions, as opposed to casual intrusions, occur based on the intent of the intruder. See id. A
casual intrusion may result when a person is taking a picture from their balcony in the city and
inadvertently takes a picture of another person in a state of undress simply because the person's
blinds were not down and they were standing near the window. In the event that this happens,
the casual intrusion would likely still meet the statutory requirement in Michigan. Even though
the invasion was incidental to the taking of the picture, the effect should still be the same.
26. See, e.g., Abate, 306 N.W.2d at 478.
27. 54 P.3d 147 (Wash. 2002) (en banc).
28. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.115.
A person commits the crime of voyeurism if, for the purpose of arousing or
gratifying the sexual desire of any person, he or she knowingly views,
photographs, or films another person, without that person's knowledge and
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organs "up their skirts" when they were in line at a public location.29
According to the Supreme Court of Washington:
The voyeurism statute protects an individual 'while the person
... is in a place where he or she would have a reasonable
expectation of privacy. . . . Grammatically, it does not make
sense to apply this statement to a part of the person's body
[because it] is the person who is in the place, not a part of the
person .... Thus, it is the physical location of the person
that is
3°
"
body.
person's
the
of
part
the
not
issue,
at
ultimately
This is the fundamental difference between statutes that punish
peepers taking photographs or viewing a person being observed in a
public place versus a victim that is in a private place. The "place" is not
the body part, not the place on his or her body, but the place itself where
the victim is standing in.
Washington's legislature reacted fast and hard to the Glas decision.3 '
Glas was decided on September 19, 2002 and on May 12, 2003, the
Washington legislature amended the statute stating, "This act is
necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or
safety, or support of the state government and its existing public
institutions, and takes effect immediately May 12, 2003. "32 The statute
was amended to include criminal liability for a person who "knowingly
views, photographs, or films ... [t]he intimate areas of another person
without that person's knowledge and consent and under circumstances
where the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, whether in a
public or private place. 33
Just recently, Florida has run afoul of similar problems. In 2007,
Keith W. Wilson, a 42 year old Floridian nurse and resident of
Bradenton, Florida, walked up to a woman in a green dress at a local
Wal-Mart and took a picture up her skirt while she was shopping. 34 She
was completely oblivious to this fact, but a security guard managed to

consent, while the person being viewed, photographed, or filmed is in a place
where he or she would have a reasonableexpectation ofprivacy.
Glas, 54 P.3d at 149 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.115).

29.
30.
31.
32.

Glas, 54 P.3d at 150.
Id.
2003 Wash. Sess. Laws 213 § 2.
Id.; Glas, 54 P.3d at 147.

33. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.115 (2010).
34. Michael A. Scarcella, Voyeurism Case Tests Privacy: Attorney Says Photos in Public
are Allowed, HERALD TRIBUNE, July 16, 2007, at BCE 1, available at http://www.heraldtribune.

con/article/20070716/NEWS/707160525.
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see everything and notified her. 35 William Price III, Wilson's lawyer,
"push[ed] to have the charges dismissed, saying a person does not have
an expectation of privacy while shopping in a local store. ' 36 Price urged
that privacy "do[es] not extend beyond restrooms and fitting rooms. 37
In fact, Price expressly argued that Florida's statute "does not define 3a
location in which a victim had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 9
Also, Price argued that Wilson's act was in a public place, and that a
public place does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 39 But
Wilson's challenge failed and the court, after hearing arguments on
April 5, 2007, decided against Wilson and allowed the information to
stand. 40 As a result, Wilson entered a Plea of Nolo Contendere 4 1 and
was sentenced to twelve months probation.42
Dickey Hough, Assistant State Attorney for Manatee County,
Florida, successfully convicted Wilson not because the court heard the
case and decided the matter.43 Hough convicted Wilson not because a
jury found him guilty of the crime charged based on testimony, facts
44
presented, evidence, deliberation, and an adjudication of the facts.
Hough convicted Wilson because he pled for mercy of the court.45
Accordingly, the issue has yet to have a determinative finding based on
an adversarial challenge in any of Florida's appellate courts.
Price relied on Ward v. State4 6 for the determination of what
reasonable expectation of privacy existed when arguing on behalf of
Wilson. 47 In Ward, a police officer, inspecting a public park's restroom
based on reports of frequent public sexual activity by homosexuals,
observed the defendant masturbating by peering through a crack along

35. Id.
36. Id.
37.

Id.

38. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 1, Wilson v. State, No. 2007-MM-000073 (Fla. 12th Cir.
Ct. Mar. 26, 2007).
39.

Id.

40. Order Den. Def s Mot. to Dismiss Information at 1, Wilson v. State, No. 2007-MM000073 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. Apr. 13, 2007).
41. Plea of No Contest at 1, Wilson v. State, No. 2007-MM-000073 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3, 2007). Nolo contendere means "I do not wish to contend" in Latin. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1147 (9th ed. 2009).
42. J.of Guilt & Placing of Def. on Probation at 1, Wilson v. State, No. 2007-MM000073 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. Dec. 13, 2007).
43. See id.
44. See id.
45. Plea of No Contest at 1, Wilson v. State, No. 2007-MM-000073 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct.
Dec. 3, 2007).
46. 636 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
47. Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 1, Wilson v. State, No. 2007-MM-000073 (Fla. 12th Cir.
Ct. Mar. 26, 2007).
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the door in a public park's restroom stall.48 The defendant, Ward,
appeared to be unaware of a hole that lead to the adjacent stall where
another man was placing his hand. 49 Both men were behind closed
doors.5° In its decision, the court indicated that the question of whether
an invasion of a reasonable expectation of privacy occurred should be
determined by ascertaining 51whether the "interior . . . could be freely
seen from the public areas."
Two problems resulted from relying on Ward. First, the Ward
decision was based on Fourth Amendment 52 law which bars a state
actor, not a private citizen, from invading another's privacy absent
probable cause.5 3 Second, even if the same standard were to apply, up a
woman's skirt is not an area that "could be freely seen" from the
ground. 54 In order to better understand Ward's rule, noting that the issue
of whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists depends on
whether the "interior could be freely seen from ... public areas," it is
helpful to consider Miriam-Webster's definitions of "freely., 55 Freely is
defined as:
[I]n a free manner: as [1] of one's own accord: WILLINGLY...
[2] not in bondage, in freedom... : by free men... ; [3] without
restraint or reserve : PLENTIFULLY, ABUNDANTLY... ; [4] without
hindrance : UNCONSTRAINEDLY . . . [5] with freedom of strict
observance of any model, pattern, convention, or rule .... 56
No regulation or judicial interpretation can be made that makes a
rule unenforceable. Thus, Merriam-Webster's second, third, and fifth
listed definitions of freely should not be used to interpret the meaning of
freely in Ward's rule. If there were complete freedom, no "restraints,"
and no "rules" to be followed, then there is no rule or regulation at all.
How can one interpret a rule, whose function is to restrict and define the
limits of behavior, to not restrict behavior or even to have no rule? The
result is non sequitur and therefore not possible.
48. Ward, 636 So. 2d at 69.
49. Id.
50. See id.
51. Id. at71.
52. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
53. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985) (holding that state actors can
include persons working for the state, outside law enforcement officers, where disciplinary
actions of a state representative are statutorily determined to be "in furtherance of publicly
mandated... disciplinary policies").
54. Ward, 636 So. 2dat71.
55.

Id.; see WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 906 (3d unabr. ed. 2002)

[hereinafter WEBSTER'S].

56.

WEBSTER'S,

supra note 55.
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Merriam-Webster's first listed definition of freely does not work
either. To decide that freely means "of one's own accord" would
literally result in the person being able to be anywhere at all times. This
interpretation, best for the defense of one who is being accused of this
crime, would make the definition of freely in Ward's rule too
overbroad, permitting an individual to be anywhere that his or her body
permits within the public area so long as he or she does so "willingly."
Reaching up a person's gown, or into another's clothing, is invasive
by definition and allowing an interpretation that gives access to a
person's internal personal space, within a victim's clothing, is
impermissibly beyond the scope of socially acceptable behavior. It
makes absolutely no sense to interpret the facts of Ward in such a
manner. Ward, masturbating in a public restroom, had his view
obstructed by a physical barrier. But his actions could be seen by the
officer through the cracks in the stall. Therefore, applying MerriamWebster's first listed definition of freely would have resulted in the
opposite outcome in Ward because the officer's view would then be
"freely" made through the crack. Thus, this definition of freely also
does not work for the test as set out in Ward.
This leaves Merriam-Webster's fourth listed definition as the only
possible interpretation of freely that makes sense in this context. When
interpreting whether the "interior could be freely seen from public
areas," an interpretation meaning "without hindrance" makes most
sense. The "hindrance" here would be a physical barrier that
substantially keeps the activity out of the public view. In the case of up
skirt photography, the skirt itself would be a physical barrier. And it
would be impracticable for a human being to lay down on the ground in
such a manner to gaze up the skirts of clothing worn by women. A
woman is not a vehicle that people commonly slide under to change oil.
Additionally, clothing itself, acting as a barrier, would prevent
persons from placing their eyes through the clothing of others to view.
Or, in the case of section 810.145, the placing of a recording device
secretly within or underneath clothing,5 7 causes the clothing to act as a
barrier to the public's view. Lastly, the statute would also protect
against technology that penetrates clothing because persons do not
expect their clothing to require a special material that prevents such
technology from piercing through clothes.
Washington's voyeurism statute is the closest in language, both in
plain words and as interpreted through legislative intent, to what Florida
legislators desired when they drafted section 810.145.58 Collectively,
57.

FLA. STAT. § 810.145(2)(c) (2011).

58. Judiciary Comm. SB 284 Staff Analysis, supra note 18, at 6-7 ("A statute in the state
of Washington contain[s] comparable provisions to those created by [this] bill .... ").
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the application of the reasoning in Glas, decided in 2002, Florida's
legislative intent to support Washington's statutory language expressed
in the Staff Analysis of Florida's 2004 legislative session, and Florida's59
express rejection of the "freely be seen" argument in Wilson v. State,
demonstrates that it is rational to infer that section 810.145 provides a
reasonable expectation of privacy to the person's body in both public
and private places.
Florida does not use the words "in any private place" or "in" a place
at all throughout its definition. Instead Florida uses the word "at." 6 The
statute also uses the word "when.",6 1 Combining "at any place and time
when that person has a reasonable expectation of privacy" with the
victim's "dressing, undressing, or privately exposing the body," 62 the
plain meaning of the statute becomes clear. If the person has a
reasonable belief that, at the time that he or she is dressing, undressing,
or privately exposing his or her body, then that place is protected.
Accordingly, in order for a person to be in violation of subsections
(2)(a) and (2)(b) of section 810.145, a triggering element must be met.
That triggering element can be the victim's act of disrobing or clothing.
At that moment, the reasonable inquiry occurs. Does the victim have a
reasonable expectation of privacy at that moment at that place? If so,
then the triggering element is met and the inquiry can move forward.
This inquiry should be a question for the fact finder. A rational
interpretation of subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) shows that a public place
may become a place that is protected under the statue if the victim had a
reasonable belief that the location was private at the time the peeper
secretly recorded the victim.
Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) do not address the up skirt photography
issue. Under subsection (2)(c), any secretly viewed imaging device
intentionally used "for the purpose of viewing the body of, or the
undergarments worn by" the victim, absent the victim's knowledge or
consent, triggers this third subsection. 63 That is anyone who uses the
imaging device to acquire the image in the aforementioned way is
criminally liable.
Accordingly, subsection (2)(c) protects all women, within Florida's
jurisdiction, by discouraging people from attempting to secretly view
underwear through up skirt photography. 64 Under subsection (2)(c),
59. Order Den. Defs Mot. to Dismiss Information at 1, Wilson v. State, No. 2007-MM000073 (Fla. 12th Cir. Ct. 2007).
60.
61.

FLA. STAT. § 810.145(2)(a)-(b).
Id.

62.
63.

Id.
Id. § 810.145(2)(c).

64. Subsection (2)(c) is not exclusive to women; men are also protected if someone
illegally "uses an imaging device to secretly view, broadcast, or record under or through" his
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65

place and time are irrelevant. Whether the location of the criminal
incident is public or private is irrelevant as well.66 The illicit and illegal
act of secretly viewing a person's body can be committed anywhere at
any time by anyone! The entirety of this subsection, and whether or not
can prosecute, depends on knowledge and consent of the
a person
67
victim.
2. Sexual Organs
Speak roughly to your little boy,
And beat him when he sneezes:
He only does it to annoy,
Because he knows it teases....
Wow! wow! wow!
I speak severely to my boy,
I beat him when he sneezes;
Forhe can thoroughly enjoy
The Pepperwhen he6 pleases!
WOW! WOW! WOW!

Defining what a sexual organ means may seem rather simple, but it
is not. Florida's Legislature has not defined sexual organs and Florida's
courts have danced around the word, hesitating to define it in any clear
way. Absent a court or legislative definition, the courts typically turn to
the plain meaning of the words themselves. Merriam-Webster defines
"sexual organ" as "an organ of the reproductive system; esp: an external
69
generative organ."
Things are not that simple. Section 921.0021 of the Florida Statutes
uses the word "sexual contact" which is required for scoring criminal
sentencing guidelines under sections 775.082-.084; the sentencing
statutes are referenced in sections 810.145(6), (7).70 The courts have not
clothes. Id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining the relationship between knowledge, consent, and
secrecy).
68. CARROLL, supra note 6, at 62. The Duchess is one of the most interesting characters
in Wonderland because of her approach to baby rearing. See id.To Alice's dismay, the baby
turns into a pig. Id.at 63-64. "It was surely not without malice that Carroll turned a male baby
into a pig, for he had a low opinion of little boys." Id. at 64 n.5 (annotations by Martin Gardner).
Alice must feel the same dismay against the person that secretly recorded her nude form without
her knowledge and consent.
69. WEBSTER'S, supra note 55, at 2082.
70. FLA. STAT. §§ 775.082-.084, 810.145(6)-(7), 921.0021 (2011).
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limited the scope of "sexual contact" to external genitalia. They have
included other organs such as the breast,
anus, vagina, penis, buttocks,
7
and the area surrounding the "crotch.", '
For purpose of section 810.145 1)(d), "'privately exposing the body'
means exposing a sexual organ. '' 7 Should the courts decide to use the
traditional definition of sexual organ defined in Merriam-Webster, then
the term sexual organs would be limited to the penis and the vaginal
area as those are the only external genitalia. But should the courts
continue to interpret the term sexual organs as they have for purposes of
sentencing under this statute, which is most likely the case, then other
areas such as the breasts, buttocks, anus, and area surrounding the
crotch will be included among sexual organs that may not be exposed
absent knowledge and consent of the victim, warranting criminal
punishment to the secret video voyeur.
B. Rabbit: It's All About the Timing

"'Oh dear! Oh dear! I shall be too late!' . . . [then] the Rabbit
actually took a watch out of its waistcoat-pocket, and looked at it, and
then hurried on ....
1. Secretly Recording Versus Knowledge and Consent of the Victim
For a person to be found liable under section 810.145 of the Florida
Statutes, the recording of an unconsented to, or unknown, image must
be made in secret. 74 That is, the image recording must be made without
the knowledge and consent of the person.75 The question is: Why does
the statute require both "secrecy" and "knowledge and consent?" The
statute obviously requires both as indicated by the Jury Instructions
issued by the Supreme Court of Florida. 76
71. See, e.g., Knarich v. State, 866 So. 2d 165, 171 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004)
(fondling the buttocks); Altman v. State, 852 So. 2d 870, 871 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(contacting between tongue, area around crotch, and buttocks); Seagrave v. State, 802 So. 2d
281, 283, 290-91 (fondling penis through clothing); Fredette v. State, 786 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (touching a vaginal area); Kitts v. State, 766 So. 2d 1067, 1069 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (fondling and kissing breasts).
72.

FLA. STAT. § 810.145(l)(d).

73. CARROLL, supra note 6, at 11-12. Timing is everything when it comes to knowledge
and consent. Rabbit's struggle with time is much like the struggle between a secret and
knowledge. Without a secret, the knowledge is clear for all to see. Therefore, so long as there is
a secret, the knowledge is hidden away from the person who seeks it. Poor Rabbit, he never does
catch up.
74. FLA. STAT. § 810.145 (requiring each subsection to use the word "secretly," or relying
on a subsection that does so, to trigger the liability of the offending party).
75. Id.
76. In re Standard Jury Instruction in Crminial Cases-Report No. 2007-5, 982 So. 2d
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The first element of "the crime of Commercial Video Voyeurism" is
met when the defendant "intentionally [used] [or] [installed] an imaging
device to secretly [view] [broadcast] [or] [record] (victim) for [his] [her]
own [amusement] [entertainment] [sexual arousal] [gratification] [or]
[profit] [or] for the purpose of degrading or abusing (victim)." 77 The
important thing here is that this element requires actions and intent from
the defendant. Whereas the second element requires that the forbidden
result actually happen; that is the "([v]ictim) was thereby [viewed]
[broadcast] [or] [recorded] at a time when the (victim) was [dressing]
[undressing] [or] [privately exposing [his] [her] body] .,,78 The third
element provides the place and time that the event must occur for the act
to be criminal. The act must have happened "[a]t the place and time,
when (victim) was [viewed] [broadcast]
[or] [recorded], [he] [she] had a
79
reasonable expectation of privacy."
But the last element requires "[tihe [viewing] [broadcast] [or]
[recordin,0 of (victim) was without the knowledge and consent of
(victim)." This last element does not depend on the defendant. In fact,
the only person that is relevant here is the victim. Both knowledge and
consent are required. But if the person has knowledge, then does this
knowledge destroy the "secrecy" element? After all, because both
knowledge and consent are required, then does it not stand to reason
that if the victim has knowledge, but does not consent to the images,
then the act is not criminal because it is no longer a secret? This would
lead to cruel results indeed, even more malicious than the lack of a
statute. If a defendant can record a victim disrobing without consent,
and the defendant can be held criminally liable just because the victim
realized that the defendant recorded the victim, then such a result would
undermine the purpose of the statute.
The "secrecy" element is initially triggered at the time the recording
device is installed or activated. If the victim notices the device and
agrees to the recording, then the "secrecy" element is not met. But if the
victim notices the device, and does not consent to the recording, then
the "secrecy" is met. In this case, it is all about the timing. The
"secrecy" element is a precursor to the "knowledge and consent"
element. Without the "secrecy" element, the "knowledge and consent"
element is irrelevant. The two elements must operate in that order. Each
element is separate of the other; one requires an act and intent from the
defendant, and the second requires the lack of both knowledge and
consent of the victim.
1160, 1163 (Fla. 2008).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.

80.

Id.
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C. Mad Hatter:Legislative Intent
"'Have you guessed the riddle yet?' the Hatter said, turning to Alice
again.
'No, I give it up,' Alice replied. 'What's the answer?'
81
'I haven't the slightest idea,' said the Hatter."
1. Who is Being Protected from Whom
Persons to be protected are persons that are secretly recorded, via a
hidden imaging device, by a person with a forbidden purpose (specific
intent), without the knowledge and consent of the victim. 2 Knowledge
and consent are key to this inquiry. And even if knowledge and consent
did not exist, section 810.145 of the Florida Statutes does not protect
persons recorded pursuant to a lawful investigation by law
enforcement. 83 Nor does this statute protect persons recorded in areas
where the recording device is clear and immediately obvious. 84 Lastly,
when there is a conspicuously posted written notice on the premises, the
find liability on the person that installed, recorded, or
statute shall not
85
took an image.

The criminal defendant here, the person that the legislature is trying
to protect the victim from, is the person who secretly hides the imaging
device, or who secretly records an image using an already hidden
imaging device, or lastly who uses an imaging device in such a way as
to penetrate the victim's clothing, either through or underneath, to view
the person's body or undergarments. 86 Subsections (2)(a), (2)(b), and
(2)(c) each require specific intent from the defendant and proof of any
entertainment, sexual arousal,
one forbidden purpose-"amusement,
87
profit."
or
gratification,
The specific intent varies slightly at this point and depends on the
means by which the recorded image is taken. If the image is actually
recorded by the defendant, then the added specific intent exists for
recordings made "for the purpose of degrading or abusing another

81. CARROLL, supra note 6, at 72. Legislative intent may change with each election. For
this reason, courts are careful when interpreting statutes using legislative intent. Who knows
what the legislature intended? The Hatter did not have the faintest idea.
82.

FLA. STAT. § 810.145(2) (2011).

83. Id. § 810.145(5)(a).
84. Id. § 810.145(5)(c).
85. Id. § 810.145(5)(b). The idea of a man running around with a conspicuously written
notice on his or her T-shirt secretly taking pictures up women's skirts, although apparently
absurd, may be sufficient to raise a defense in a criminal or civil case.
86.

Id. § 810.145(2).

87.

Id.
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person."88 If the image is not taken, but the hidden imaging equipment
is installed, then the prosecutor must prove that the person recorded the
image with a forbidden purpose. This proven intent is then transferred
to the person that installed the equipment. This transferred intent is read
directly from the part of the statute that describes the forbidden intent as
"[f]or the amusement, entertainment, sexual arousal, gratification, or
profit of another, or on behalf of another." 89 Lastly, when secret images
are taken through the clothing or underneath the clothing to view the
undergarments, the specific intent can be a forbidden purpose of the
defendant or of another person. 90 In other words, the intent need not be
for the recording person's own forbidden pu ose but can be based on
the forbidden purpose of a different person. This happens when the
person performing the forbidden act does so to amuse, entertain,
sexually arouse, gratify, or profit another person.
2. Audio Silence: Florida Statute Chapter 934
Section 810.145 applies only to those images that have no audio
recording associated with them. If a recording has an audio component
to it then chapter 934 of the Florida Statutes governs that area of the
law. 92 For purposes of this Note, a presumption must exist that all
images do not have recorded sounds made by the unwary victims of
video voyeurism. The pertinent area of chapter 934 is much more
developed as it has been around for decades. 93 There are circumstances
where a case involving a video image with audio cannot be tried under
chapter 934 but may result in liability under section 810.145.94 So if the
recording has both images and audio, and the recording meets the
elements of both statutes, then the State of Florida must look to
prosecute under one or the other of these statutes. The reason for this is
because a prosecutor trying a case under chapter 934, the chapter
governing unconsented recordings of an oral communication over wire
communications using an electronic device, may end up convicting a
defendant for the lesser offense of an unconsented to video recording
under section 810.145 in error.
That is not to say a third person, who secretly recorded two separate
victims that were dressing, disrobing, or exposing their bodies to each
88. Id.§ 810.145(2)(a).
89. Id.§ 810.145(2)(b).
90. Id.§ 810.145(2)(c).
91. See id
92. Id.ch. 934.
93. Id.§ 934.10. This statute has been around since its introduction in 1969. See id.
94. Compare id.§ 934.03(2)(a)-(j) (listing ten methods of lawful recordings of oral
communication using electronic devices), with id. § 810.145(5) (providing only five exceptions
to the video voyeurism law).
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other at the same time in a place where the victims had a reasonable
expectation of privacy, may not be charged twice under section
810.145. Under this hypothetical, the two persons still had a reasonable
expectation of privacy from the third person and the public. Therefore,
under the circumstances of this hypothetical, the person recording the
two individuals may be tried under two separate counts so long as
neither of the two recorded victims had knowledge, and neither consent
at the time of the recording.
D. Caterpillar:FloridaCourts and Florida'sLaw
"It is wrong from beginning to end," said the Caterpillar,
decidedly; and there was silence for some minutes.
Alice said nothing: she had never been so much contradicted
in all her life before, and she felt that she was losing her temper.
"Are you content now?" said the Caterpillar.
[T]he Caterpillar... put the hookah into its mouth, and began
smoking again.
1. Fourth Amendment and Florida's Right to Privacy
The Fourth Amendment says:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
But as mentioned before, the viewer must be a state actor for a search to
trigger a Fourth Amendment inquiry.97 But if a state actor does use
images acquired through up skirt photography pursuant to a lawful
investigation, what is the proper standard? More importantly, how
would Florida's video voyeurism laws interact with law enforcement
95.

CARROLL, supra note 6, at 52-53. Alice's frustration is well understood since so

many victims of this crime fail to report incidents because they are completely unaware of their
status as a victim. How can someone report something they do not know happens? Does a crime
exist if no one but the criminal knows it happened? Does society still suffer? Surely the injured
party still suffers the injury, but if they are unaware of the injury, is there really a cost to

society?
96.
97.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336-37 (1985).
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officers that use these secretly acquired images for purposes barred by
section 810.145 of the Florida Statutes?
To determine whether a constitutional issue exists, a court must
apply the test set forth in Kyllo v. United States which addresses
whether a state actor impermissibly invades the privacy of a person by
using technology that pierces the barriers of the person's clothing. 98 In
Kyllo, police used heat sensing technology to pierce the protective
99
sanctum of a person's home to "see" what was happening inside.
Justice Scalia of the U.S. Supreme Court explained that any time a
police officer uses "more than the naked-eye surveillance" there may be
a Fourth Amendment issue raised by the police action.' 00 Thus, at issue
was whether it was constitutional for the police to use technology from
the vantage point of the public street to pierce the home of the person to
gather information. '31 When deciding on issues of technology, the Court
explained that "'[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light
of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was
adopted, and in a manner which will conserve the public interests as
well as interests and rights of individual citizens."" 0 2 It is always
important to remember that "the Fourth Amendment protects people,
not places."' 1 3 Also, a Fourth Amendment search occurs when a state
actor acts against "'the individual [who] manifested a subjective
expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search'0 4 and
'society [is] willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable.""1
The test used to consider whether police can use sense-enhancing
technology requires that the "interior [of the viewed area] ... could not
otherwise have been obtained [absent a] physical 'intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area.' ' 5 When this triggering condition is
met, a Fourth Amendment search results "at least where . . . the
technology in question is not in general public use."' 0 6 But even if the
technology in question is available for general public use, the courts
would require more. After all, Justice Scalia chose words such as "at
least" when defining the holding of the court. 10 7 More importantly,
Justice Scalia expressly noted that the question as to whether the
"general public use" requirement is "a factor," instead of the standard,
shall only become an issue for the Court to decide when the technology
98.
99.

See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 46-49 (2001).
Id. at 30.

100. Id. at 33.
101.

Id.

102.

Id. at 40 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).

103.

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).

104. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986)).
105. Id. at 34 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)).
106. Id.
107.

Id.
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available for general public use is used"routine[ly].'' 8
George Eastman made cameras available to the general public in
1888 when "he made a cumbersome and complicated process easy to
use and accessible to nearly everyone. ' 1° 9 Cell phone cameras have
been around for over a decade; thanks to the creative ingenuity of
Philippe Kahn.'10 Thus, the use of the camera for up skirt photography
is available for general public use. But is the practice of using the
camera for up skirt photography routine for such users? According to all
the states that have criminalized the behavior, the answer is clearly
yes.' The thought of sneaking a peak up a woman's skirt existed well
before the advent of the camera by George Eastman in 1888.112
Therefore, the time is ripe for the Supreme Court to construe laws
that relate to the constitutional right of privacy and law enforcement.
For the issue to come before the Court, there would need to be officers
or other state actors that, in an official capacity, violate the Fourth
Amendment rights of a viewed person. But once an up skirt imaging
device is used by law enforcement for law enforcement purposes, say to
discover whether a woman is smuggling contraband or shoplifting, and
there is no knowledge or consent of the victim/suspect, and the image is
also used to provide amusement or sexual arousal to the
viewer/recording officer, then this dual-purpose act would trigger both a
Fourth Amendment question under Kyllo and a section 810.145
violation inquiry.
Applying Kyllo, an on-duty law enforcement officer that views the
undergarments or private parts of any person through or underneath his
or her clothing still violates Fourth Amendment rights, even though the
taking of up skirt photography is routine and the technology is publicly
available absent a showing of probable cause. This is because the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and when construing the
108.

Id. at 40 n.6.

109.

History of Kodak, KODAK, http://www.kodak.com/ek/US/en/OurCompany/History_

ofKodak/Imaging-_thebasics.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
110. Kevin Maney, Baby's Arrival Inspires Birth of Cellphone Camera - and Societal
Evolution, USA TODAY (Jan. 23, 2007, 10:55PM), http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/

technology/maney/2007-01-23-kahn-cellphone-camera-x.htm.
11l.

See, e.g., Jo Napolitano, Hold it Right There, and Drop that Camera, N.Y. TIMES

(Dec. 11, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2003/12/1 1/technology/hold-it-right-there-and-dropthat-camera.html; NAT'L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR VICTIMS OF
CRIME: VIDEO VOYEURISM LAWS 1-7 (2005), available at http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/AGP.Net/

Components/documentViewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentlD=40459 (providing a list of state
laws that protect against video voyeurism).
112. Jean-Honor6 Fragonard, The Swing, WALLACE COLLECTION (original painting 1767),
available at http://wallacelive.wallacecollection.org/eMuseumPlus?service=Extemallnterface&

module=collection&objectld=65364 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012) (painting the frothy pink silk
covered swinging lady, Fragonard, a French painter, tantalizes the viewer and the elder hiding in
the bushes, while she floats in the center, poised in mid-air for all to see).
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Fourth Amendment, the Court will do so "'in the light of what was
deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted
.... ,,,113 It is doubtful that even the most liberal founders of the U.S.
Constitution would consider the act of peeping up through a lady's dress
to be permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Also, when balancing
this issue against the public's interest, it is unlikely that any public
interest will outweigh the individual's privacy interest in his or her own
body from the view of law
enforcement, absent probable cause that
14
criminal activity is afoot."
In order for a police officer to lawfully enter constitutionally
protected areas, such as by touching a person with the purpose of
discovering dangerous evidence, Terry v. Ohio requires that there are5
articulable facts that support the officer's reasonable suspicion."
Therefore, if a police officer stands from a public street and uses
technology to pierce a person's clothing to view underneath, the
officer's act is probably unlawful under the Fourth Amendment, if there
are no facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
However, if a Florida state investigator uses technology to secretly
pierce a criminal suspect's clothing to gather an image, absent the
suspect's consent but with probable cause that criminal activity is afoot,
what would happen to the investigator if he or she uses the image for his
or her own amusement, sexual arousal, gratification, entertainment, or
profit? Depending on how section 810.145 is interpreted, the answer
could be disturbing.
A literal interpretation of section 810.145 indicates that the
investigator may not be convicted in the State of Florida for violating
the statute so long as he or she is lawfully surveying the area. 1 6 Section
810.145(5)(a) states, "This section does not apply to any . . . [f]aw
enforcement agency conducting surveillance for a law enforcement
purpose."'' 7 Thus, after combining Article I, sections 12 and 23 of the
Florida Constitution, with subsection (5)(a) of section 810.145, one
could infer that as long as a law enforcement officer is lawfully
surveying a suspect within the scope of the Fourth Amendment, with a
showing of probable cause that criminal activity is afoot, then the law
enforcement officer may secretly take images through or underneath the
suspect's clothing for his or her amusement, entertainment, sexual
arousal, gratification, and profit, without being punished under section
810.145. "
113.

Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925)).

114.
115.
116.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
Terry, 392 U.S. at 33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
FLA. STAT. § 810.145(5)(a) (2011).

117.

Id.

118.

Although the law enforcement officer might avoid punishment under section 810.145,
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With a state that has expressly provided the public with an
expectation of privacy against state actors, how is it possible for law
enforcement to avoid punishment under section 810.145? The answer
might be found within the Florida Constitution. Florida's right to
privacy expressly states, "Every natural person has the right to be let
alone and free from governmental intrusion into the person's private life
except as otherwise provided herein."1 19 The phrase "except as
otherwise provided herein" was written into the Florida Constitution in
order to prevent any impediments to law enforcement from those that
rely on Article I, section 12, as a guide for what is pernissible and not
permissible when searching and seizing evidence from criminal
suspects.12 When drafting section 810.145, the Florida Legislature
considered the fact that video surveillance is widely used for policing
purposes as it noted that "[m]ore than sixty metropolitan areas in the
United States use video surveillance in public areas for law enforcement
of apprehending criminals after-the-fact and for
purposes - as a means
2
crime prevention."'

1

If a search, involving a law enforcement officer that secretly obtains
22
images, is not repugnant to both the U.S. and Florida Constitutions,1
then there is a good possibility that the evidence could still be used,
even if the law enforcement officer used the secretly obtained images in
violation of section 810.145. Also, as earlier suggested in this Note, the
law enforcement officer would not be held liable under the statute for
misuse of the secretly obtained images. Other Florida agencies that are
not considered law enforcement, such as school administrators, social
workers, and government officials, would not benefit from this
exemption and would be held liable under section 810.145 for improper
uses of secretly obtained images.
2. Criminal or Civil Liability
A victim under section 810.145 of the Florida Statutes could likely
choose to file a civil cause of action against the person that secretly
recorded the victim absent his or her knowledge and consent. This is
the officer would likely be punished under laws outside of the statute.
119. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
120. Honorable Ben F. Overton & Katherine E. Giddings, The Right of Privacy in Florida
in the Age of Technology and the Twenty-First Century: A Need for Protectionfrom Privateand
Commercial Intrusion, 25 FLA. ST. UNIv. L. REV. 25, 34-35 (1997).

121. Judiciary Comm. SB 284 Staff Analysis, supra note 18, at 2.
122. Overton & Giddings, supra note 120, at 34 n.65 (explaining that Article I, section 12,
of the Florida Constitution protects citizens to the same capacity that the Fourth Amendment of
the U.S. Constitution and that, in addition to these protections, Florida's Constitution expressly
provides added protection, only from state actors, as described in Article I, section 23, of the
Florida Constitution).
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because a civil cause of action may arise from duty created by a
criminal statute. 123 For example, in 2011, an IRS Agent named Kenneth
Wayne Ryals rented out an apartment in Davie, Florida to a twenty-four
year old woman, placed a tiny video camera in her VHS recorder facing
her bed, and recorded and viewed his tenant for two years without her
knowledge. 124 After confessing this information to the Davie Police
Department, Mr. Ryals consented to a search of his property. 125 But
was suppressed in the misdemeanor
even with the consent, the evidence
1 26
Ryals.
Mr.
against
criminal action
The victim then filed a civil action against Mr. Ryals and the jury
awarded the victim $476,200.127 The jury awarded $275,000 in punitive
damages because at no time did Mr. Ryals show any remorse for what
he did. 128 In fact, when interviewed by the Davie Police, he coldly
indicated that he secretly videotaped his twenty-four year old tenant
solely for his viewing pleasure. 129 Cases like this exemplify why there is
a need for an overlap between criminal and civil liability.
E. Jabberwocky: Disseminationof the Recording
"Beware the Jabberwock, my son!
The jaws that bite, the claws that catch!
Beware the Jubjub bird, and shun130
The Frumious Bandersnatch!',
1. Defining Dissemination
Section 810.145(3) of the Florida Statutes criminalizes the behavior
of video voyeurism dissemination.' 3 1 In part, section 810.145(3) states
"if [a] person, knowing or having reason to believe that [a section
123. Jury Awards $476,200 Against IRS Agentfor Serially Spying on Female Tenant, 24-7
Jury Awards $476,200], http://
[hereinafter
2011)
21,
RELEASE (Jan.
PRESS
= 1
(Jan.
21,
6722062&Page=MEDIAVIEWER
finance.optonline.net/opton%201ine/?GUID
2011), available at http://finance.optonline.net/opton line/?GUID=16722062&Page=MEDIA
VIEWER.
124. Carmel Cafiero, Carmel on the Case: Video Voyeurism, WSVN 7 NEWS (Jan. 18,
2011), http://www.wsvn.com/features/articles/carmelcase/MI90832/.
125. Jury Awards $476,200, supra note 123.

126.

Id.

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Cafiero, supra note 124.
130. CARROLL, supra note 6, at 148. Dissemination changes the status of the secretly
viewed recording into something bigger, viewed by a larger audience. At this point, the cost to
society grows more and more as people become aware of the unwitting victim's exposed body.
What was unknown now becomes the thing of nightmares.
131. FLA. STAT. § 810.145(3)-(4) (2011).
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810.145(2)] image was created . . . , intentionally disseminates,
distributes, or transfers the image to another person for the purpose of
amusement, entertainment, sexual arousal, gratification, or profit, or for
the purpose of degrading or abusing another person," then the person
1 32
has committed the crime of video voyeurism dissemination
Commercial video voyeurism dissemination occurs when a defendant:
"(a) [k]nowing or having reason to believe that [a section 810.145(2)]
image was created . . ., sells the image for consideration to another
person; or (b) [h]aving created the [section 810.145(2)] image ...,
disseminated, distributes, or transfers the image to another person for
that person to sell the image to others."13 3 The following subsection of
this Note discusses what result occurs when section 810.145 is
confronted with the video voyeur's First Amendment rights in Florida.
2. First Amendment Does Not Apply
The First Amendment likely does not protect a video voyeur from
prosecution in Florida for violating sections 810.145(3) and 810.145(4)
of the Florida Statutes. The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
states that "Congress shall make no law ...abridging the freedom of
speech.,134 Through the incorporation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
states are prohibited from abridging constitutionally protected speech of
citizens of the United States. 35 The Court has developed very protective
devices to ensure that there are significant protections that allow
individuals to express themselves. Reasons include a search for truth
through a marketplace of ideas, to foster democracy, and as part of the
essence offreedom and autonomy.
The first question that needs to be addressed is whether or not a
section 810.145(2) image is considered speech. The second question is
whether the statute itself is either generally overbroad, overbroad as
applied, or constitutionally permitted. The third question is whether this
type of speech, the image itself, is protected speech. The last question is
to determine whether the speech is protected. In other words, is the
speech itself being regulated so as to trigger strict scrutiny, or is the
restriction based on time, place, and manner, therefore triggering a more
relaxed intermediate scrutiny. This statute criminalizing video
voyeurism dissemination, for personal or commercial reasons, will
132. Id.
133. Id. § 810.145(4).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
135. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
136. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.").
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likely be considered constitutionally permissible under the First
Amendment.
a. Section 810.145(2) Images May Qualify as Protected Speech
An image of a person dressing, disrobing, or otherwise exposing his
or her body is likely to be considered speech. A person is "speaking"
when his or her expressive conduct communicates an idea to another. r37
Conduct is considered speech when there is intent to convey a specific
message, and there is a substantial likelihood that the message would be
138
understood by those receiving it.
A person who is dressing, disrobing,
or otherwise exposing his or her body and is unaware of a recording
device, is probably not conveying a message to the camera or the person
recording the image because the person does not know the device is
there.
The message of concern here is between the person that recorded the
image and the person receiving it. The person recording the image did
so under what is clearly an illegal and morally repugnant way. But the
image being sent could convey a number of messages. One message
could be, "look at this, isn't this beautiful." Another message could be,
"look how funny this is." Regardless of the message, a necessary and
material element of section 810.145 requires that the image taken be
used for a specific purpose. These purposes include the defendant's
"amusement, entertainment, sexual arousal, gratification, or profit, or
for the purpose of degrading or abusing another person.'' 39 The image,
depending on the facts, can meet any one, or any combination of, each
of these purposes. So, if the image is found to have met this element,
then it is likely that the same facts will show that the image is trying to
convey a message. After all, if the person took the image for a reason,
then that reason should likely be concluded from the image itself. This
conclusion would be sufficient to meet the second element if there is a
substantial likelihood that a person will interpret the intended message
through the image.
For example, a secret video recording shows an unknowing person
quickly trying on multiple sets of clothing in such a way as to get out of
the fitting room quickly. The acts of disrobing and dressing, staring at
the mirror, being dissatisfied with his or her appearance, and the final
act of disrobing and dressing back into his or her original clothing can
all be funny, informative (about the product), sexually appealing, or
merely amusing to the viewer. All of these premises would land
137.
138.
139.

See O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968).
See id. at 388-89 (Harlan, J., concurring).
FLA. STAT. § 810.145(2) (2011).
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squarely within one of the forbidden "purposes" in the statute. That
same purpose would likely be conveyed in the image because the
subject of the recording, although not conveying the message, is part of
the message being conveyed by the video voyeur.
But the purpose for recording the image secretly may not always
match the purpose for distribution. After all, the defendant recording the
image could have one purpose at the time of the recording and end up
with an entirely different purpose when it is time to distribute the image.
It can be inferred from section 810.145 that both purposes are not
required to match in order to prosecute under the statute. The only
requirements that can be inferred are that at the time of the recording,
the forbidden purpose existed and that at the time of the distribution, the
same or different forbidden purpose had also existed. With regards to
the First Amendment, the purpose at the time of distribution is the
purpose that is most likely to match the message conveyed.
This message and whatever purpose the voyeur had while recording
the image is based on common cultural norms, similar to how a person
who tells a joke provokes listeners to laugh. If the listener "gets the
joke," then the message was conveyed. We all may not share the same
sense of humor, but if there is a substantial likelihood that the viewer
will "get the message," then the distribution of the video recording will
probably be considered a message itself. Therefore, a jury would likely
have to determine whether the video recording conveys a message and
whether that message matched the intended message sent by the
distributor of the forbidden image.
b. Only Non-Obscene Images are Protected
Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner
appealing to prurient interests, that is "patently offensive," as defined by
state law, and, when "taken as a whole," lacks any "serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. ' 40 Moreover "[o]bscenity is not
is
within the area of constitutionally protected speech."' 4' Material 142
prurient when its "tendency [is] to excite lustful thoughts."'
the
Specifically, the material must appeal to the prurient interests of143
standards."'
community
"contemporary
the
applying
person,
average
The first requirement of obscene material is that the material must be
patently offensive. 144 Examples of patently offensive material include
"representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or
140.

Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).

141.
142.

Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
Id. at 487 n.20.

143.

Miller, 413 U.S. at 37.

144.

Id.at 24.
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perverted, actual or simulated."'145 Also, representations or descriptions
of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibitions of the
genitals, are patently offensive. 146 "'N]udity alone is not enough to
The last requirement of obscene
make material legally obscene. ...
material is that the material, when taken as a whole does not have any
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. ?48
The act of getting dressed or removing clothing may cause a person
to think about sexual intercourse. Human beings procreate through
sexual intercourse.1 49 But this does not mean that the only reason why
humans engage in sexual intercourse is because of procreation., 50 Many
human beings enjoy sex for the mere pleasures associated with the
act.151 Because sexual intercourse often occurs shortly after a person
disrobes, or in the event that sexual intercourse has already
occurred-the person gets dressed, the image of an individual removing
1
his or her clothing, or putting them on, can arouse lustful thoughts.
For these reasons, it is likely that candid and secreted images of a
person dressing or disrobing may be considered prurient.
Images of a person revealing his or her body, specifically sexual
organs referenced in section 810.145 of the Florida Statutes, probably
meet the definition of what excites the prurient interests in any
community. Secretly viewing a person exposing his or her sexual organs
is not unlike opening a present where the surprise inside is the
145. Id.at 25; FLA. STAT. §§ 847.001(1), .001(16) (2011). Contemporary standards of
patently offensive sexual conduct in Florida are defined as
actual or simulated sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse, sexual
bestiality, masturbation, or sadomasochistic abuse; actual lewd exhibition of
the genitals; actual physical contact with a person's clothed or unclothed
genitals, pubic area, buttocks, or, if such person is female, breast with the intent
to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of either party; or any act or conduct
which constitutes sexual battery or simulates that sexual battery is being or will
be committed. A mother's breastfeeding of her baby does not under any
circumstance constitute "sexual conduct."
FLA. STAT. §§ 847.001(10), .001(16).
146. Miller, 413 U.S. at 25.
147. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974).
148. Miller, 413 U.S. at 34. "At a minimum, prurient, patently offensive depiction or
description of sexual conduct must have serious literary artistic, political, or scientific value to
merit First Amendment Protection." Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
149. See generally ANGELA ROYSTON, WHERE Do BABIES COME FROM? (1996).
150. See generally KAMA SUTRA OF VATSYAYANA (S.C. Upadhyaya, trans., D.B.
Taraporevala Sons & Co. 1961).
151. See id. at 72.
152. Ruth Westheimer, Ask Dr. Ruth, SUNSENTINEL.COM
(Jan.
12, 1997),
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1997-01-12/lifestyle/
9701090218_ dear-reader-dear-dr-ruthwestheimer ("Men are more visual creatures than women and so they like to look at pictures.").
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unconsented view of a person's most intimate private parts. So viewing
a person dressing and disrobing may give rise to a prurient interest,
depending on the community standard in the jurisdiction where the case
is tried. But secretly viewing the exposed sexual organs of another,
absent his or her knowledge and consent, is almost always going to
meet the requirement of the prurient interest element. And since the
distribution is the expression that is being regulated here, if the visage
itself meets the prurient interest element, then so too does the
distribution because the "message" is merely being copied or circulated.
Most litigation will likely arise with material that is patently
offensive. An image showing a person disrobing or putting on clothes is
not necessarily patently offensive. However, if the person is
masturbating in the image, then the image will probably meet the
standard. An image of a person disrobing in a restroom to urinate or
defecate would probably also constitute patently offensive conduct.
Likewise, an image of a person in his or her undergarments itself is not
necessarily patently offensive. Nonetheless, if the victim of a video
voyeur is wearing no undergarments when an up skirt photograph is
taken, then it is very likely that the image would be deemed patently
offensive. This is because the bare sexual organ being viewed in this
context is not dissimilar from the lewd exhibition of the genitals.' 53 This
up skirt photograph is a secretly stolen and forced exhibition which
should be considered much worse. After all, for an image to be lewd,
the person must be willing to be recorded in the image, whereas an
image that is secretly taken forces the person to be featured in the
recorded image without a choice.
For these reasons, whether an image that recorded a person while
dressing or disrobing is patently offensive depends on its context. A
secret and unconsented video image of a person revealing his or her
sexual organs requires something more to be considered patently
offensive. Unconsented up skirt photography however, would almost
always constitute patently offensive content and shall likely meet this
element.
When taking all of these variances and putting them in the context of
the expression of the distributor, not the victim, the stench becomes ripe
to the point where no reasonable person could believe that the
expression itself, of a stolen image of a person's most intimate private
parts, is not patently offensive. Thus, although the acts in the images
themselves may vary in levels of obscenity, the person's speech being
153. See In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases-Report No. 2008-02, 998 So.
2d 1138, 1143 (Fla. 2008) ("The words 'lewd' and 'lascivious' mean the same thing and mean
wicked, lustful, unchaste, licentious, or sensual intent on the part of the person doing [the]
act."). An important note to realize is that here, the person distributing the video is "the person
doing [the] act." Id
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chilled here is not the victim. Instead, the speech of the person
distributing the image is chilled. Therefore, for purposes of distribution
of any of these images, this patently offensive element is likely met.
Lastly, secret images of a person in various states of undress, taken
without knowledge or consent of the victim, likely do not have serious
artistic, literary, political, or scientific value. Of the four factors, these
secret images are most likely to lack serious literary or political
speech. 154 Absent words, there can be no literature. However, if the
person wears undergarments with written words, and such
undergarments do exist, then there is an argument that wearing these
undergarments constitutes artistic speech. But absent the rare
occurrence of a person caught distributing secretly recorded images of a
victim wearing scripted undergarments without the victim's knowledge
and consent, there is no literary value associated with these images. The
same applies to political speech. Essentially, only artistic and science
value arguments might exist here.
Photographs and video recordings of people have traditionally been
the realm of artistic expression. 155 There are several ways in which a
person can convey a clever message based entirely on the context of the
clothing being worn. 156 Because the patently offensive standard for
obscene material requires a lack of "any artistic value taken as a whole,"
one must look closely at the context under which the person is
presenting the image. Of the forbidden purposes outlined in section
810.145, "amusement, entertainment, sexual arousal, gratification, or
profit, or for the purpose of degrading or abusing another person," all
but "degrading or abusing another person" are likely to result in artistic
154. Although an argument exists where a secret up skirt, or through the clothes, image of
a donkey (the arse) and an elephant (the trunk) brings much comic relief to some views of
political rhetoric and speech, the patently offensive standard of obscene material requires that
the conduct should be "taken as a whole." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). When
taken in context of a secret image that is being distributed without the knowledge or consent of a
victim, the victim's speech is not in question, it is the speech of the person distributing the
image. Therefore, unless the up skirt image has some redeeming political value, it is merely a
stolen image of a sexual organ. Showing an image of a politician in his or her underwear to
sway the public takes politics to places where no man, woman, or child should ever go. See, e.g.,
Raymond Hernandez, Weiner Resigns in Chaotic Final Scene, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2011,
www.nytimes.com/2011/06/17/nyregion/anthony-d-weiner-tells-friends-he-will-resign.htm?
pagewanted=all.
155.

See,

e.g., Annie Leibovitz on

"Women,"

and Her Career, NYTIMES.COM,

http://www.nytimes.com/library/photos/leibovitz/interview.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2012);
History of the Academy Awards, OSCARS.ORG, http://www.oscars.org/awards/academyawards/
about/history.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2012); The Pulitzer Prizes: Honoring Excellence in
Journalism and the Arts Since 1917, PULITZER.ORG, http://www.pulitzer.org/ (last visited Mar.
3,2012).
156. See, e.g., Wyze-guy, Lucky Panties, RED BUBBLE (Sept. 26, 2010), http://www.red
bubble.com/people/wyze-guy/art/5974819-lucky-panties.
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expression. 157
"Degrading or abusing another person" in the eyes of the viewer is
not artistic, but a person that is degraded as part of a movie or video
footage could be conveying a message. An example exists through
illustration where a person takes an image not for a section 810.145
forbidden purpose, but to warn others what might happen if people are
not wary. But if the image itself is taken for the express purpose of
degrading the human being in the image, then how is that a form of
artistic expression? It is not.
If a person wishes to amuse or entertain another, then that person is
relaying a message in a way to provide an emotional response. While
doing so, the expression may be interpreted as artistic in nature. But, if
the only emotional response is the lustful and forbidden prurient
interest, then the image is not communicating a protected form of
speech. Therefore, an image secretly stolen from the person recorded
may be considered artistic only if the image conveys a constitutionally
protected message.
There are arguments that could be crafted to assert that an image of a
person dressing or disrobing has some scientific value. For example,
one could argue that an image has scientific value if a purpose of the
image was to study reactions and perceptions of a person that wears
certain clothing. Moreover, the image could have scientific value if one
is attempting to determine how certain clothing affects the person's
body.
As indicated in the above reasons, the vast majority of secretly
obtained images, absent knowledge and consent of the person viewed,
will be considered unprotected speech so long as the image is obscene.
An obscene image may be regulated freely by the states, including
l
Florida, as it shall find no protection under the First Amendment. 59
Secretly obtained images that are not considered obscene are likely to
be considered protected speech. So for those images, the question that
remains is what level of constitutional protection shall be afforded to
their disseminator? That answer can be found within section 810.145.
c. Content Neutral or Content or Viewpoint Based
Forms of expression that the states regulate based on content 15or9
viewpoint triggers the highest suspicion from the reviewing court.
157. FLA. STAT. § 810.145(2) (2011).
158. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
159. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994) ("Government action that
stifles speech on account of its message, or that requires the utterance of a particular message
favored by the Government, contravenes this essential [First Amendment] right."); R.A.V. v. St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based regulations are presumptively invalid.").
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That is, an Article III court must apply the strictest scrutiny to a law that
regulates content or viewpoint; the law will be struck as
unconstitutional if the court finds that the government's compelling
interest is not regulated in the least restrictive means available for the
desired government action. 160 Such content based scrutiny is required to
ensure that constitutionally protected expression is not unnecessarily
silenced. 161
But, if the government shows that a regulation is content neutral, that
is the regulation applies to all speech regardless of its message, then the
regulation requires the Article III court to apply intermediate
scrutiny. 162 This level of scrutiny treats a regulation as unconstitutional
unless the regulation is somewhat narrowly tailored to achieve a
substantial state interest and does not leave alternative channels open
for the regulated speech. 163 A substantial state interest is not just any
government interest; it is an interest that is pressing, or legitimate, but
not compelling.164 A regulation is content neutral if it applies to all
speech regardless of the message. 65 Examples include time, place, and
manner restrictions applicable to all speakers regardless of their
message. 166
The speech expressed in obscene images may be regulated freely by
the states, as in Florida. Secretly obtained images obtained for the
"amusement, entertainment, sexual arousal, gratification, or profit, or
for the purpose of degrading or abusing another person," absent the
"knowledge and consent" of the viewed person is clearly a content and
viewpoint based restriction.16 7 After all, the government defines what
makes images forbidden in section 810.145 of the Florida Statutes. The
relevant portions of the statute explains that the content of a
disseminated image containing any "secretly view[ed], broadcast[ed], or
record[ed image of a person] who is dressing, undressing, or privately
exposing the body" is criminal so long as the image is made from the
viewpoint of a person whose purpose is the "amusement, entertainment,
sexual arousal, gratification, or profit, or for ...

degrading or abusing

160. See TurnerBroad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 641.
161. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-38 (1980) ("To
allow a government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow the
government control over the search for political truth.").
162. TurnerBroad.Sys., 512 U.S. at 642.
163. Id. at 662.
164. See id.
165. Id.at 676.
166. Id. ("The government does have the power to impose content-neutral time, place, and
manner restrictions, but this is in large part precisely because such restrictions apply to all
speakers.").
167. FLA. STAT. § 810.145(2)(a) (2011).

2012] PUSHING ALICE DOWN THE RABBIT HOLE: HOWFLORIDA 'S VIDEO VOYEURISM LAWS PROTECT
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68

135

Normally, this situation would trigger a strict

scrutiny analysis.
However, the government could argue that Florida's legislature
expressly wove into section 810.145 a time and place restriction.
Accordingly, the government can argue that any image taken at "a place
and time when the person has a reasonable expectation of privacy"
triggers a content neutral intermediate scrutiny analysis. 16 If the
government's assessment is correct, then the courts should analyze the
specific facts of the case under intermediate scrutiny.
Which of the two scrutiny standards should apply? The answer is, as
many legal scholars like to explain, "it depends." It depends on the
individual facts of the case. For example, if an image is deemed
obscene, like images taken through up skirt photography, then no
scrutiny analysis should be required. If the image is taken where a
person does, in fact, have a reasonable expectation of privacy as defined
in section 810.145(1)(c) then the image should trigger a time, place
restriction. But not so fast!
The fact that the statute includes content and viewpoint based
restrictions
complicates
things
enormously.
Should
those
constitutionally protected images, taken in a place where a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy and NOT taken for an expressed
forbidden purpose, be afforded a different protection than images taken
for a forbidden purpose? In other words, should the images taken for the
"amusement, entertainment, sexual arousal, gratification, or profit, or
for the purpose of degrading or abusing another person,' 170 be treated
differently than images taken under the same exact circumstances but
instead, for law enforcement purposes? Why is law enforcement
afforded a level of protection different than the rest of the individuals
who are recording these images? 17 1 If section 810.145 were applied
equally across the board, then the time, place, and manner restrictions
placed on the statute would probably trigger an intermediate scrutiny
analysis. Instead, the content and viewpoint based restrictions placed on
the distribution of the images likely triggers a strict scrutiny analysis
72
because the statute is not applied evenly across ALL viewpoints.1
168.
169.

Id.
Id. §§ 810.145(1)(c),(2)(a)-(b).

170. Id.§ 810.145(2)(a).
171. Id. § 810.145(5)(a).
172. The way the statute currently reads, law enforcement officers may freely distribute
video amongst each other, so long as it is subject to a lawful duty AND cannot be prosecuted
under this regulation EVEN IF they also distribute the secretly obtained images for the
"amusement, entertainment, sexual arousal, gratification, or profit" for themselves and others.
Id.§ 810.145(2), (5)(a). An example of this would be an officer handing a secretly obtained
video to another officer to show that second officer what was discovered, pursuant to a lawful
duty, AND to elicit laughter, sexual pleasure, embarrassment, or to degrade or abuse another
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Applying strict scrutiny, the proof of unconstitutionality now
becomes a much more difficult one. What is the compelling interest?
What is forcing the government to create a regulation? The answer lies
in the problem. Persons have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
Florida. This privacy interest is constitutionally mandated and defined
for purposes of protecting individuals from unnecessary invasions by
the state.1 73 Also, a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in any
person's home, in their person, and in their property from all persons,
including both state and non-state actors.
With such invasions
reaching into the most intimate places of a persons' privacy, their sexual
organs and their body, the government, having heard the cry of the
victims of these secret recordings, is compelled to act and protect its
citizenry from such criminal acts. 175 Such claims cannot be limited to
mere civil tortuous liability because of the social costs associated with
this crime.
Say, for example, a family plans a road trip to visit relatives for
person! The courts may construe the statute differently, but in doing so they would probably
have to give greater weight to section 810.145(2) than they would section 810.145(5). However,
this is unlikely to happen because the legislative intent is to not hinder law enforcement. See
Judiciary Comm. SB 284 Staff Analysis, supra note 18, at 5 ("The bill exempts from its
provisions any law enforcement agency conducting surveillance for a law enforcement
purpose."). So long as the purpose of the distribution occurs as a result of law enforcement
surveillance, then the image can be used incidentally for a forbidden purpose by law
enforcement agents without fear of prosecution under section 810.145. See id. The courts really
have only two options to follow here: (1) the primary dissemination of the secret video
recording is for lawful purposes where incidental forbidden uses are allowed so long as the uses
are contemporaneous to the lawful duty; or (2) the only purpose for the dissemination allowed is
the lawful use of the secret video, forbidding all non-lawful purposes. The latter makes more
sense and encourages a more professional working environment between law enforcement. But
construing it in this way would take the teeth out of the exception. The first option is more
police friendly and more in line with legislative intent. As of April 2012, this issue has yet to be
decided.
173. See FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 12, 23.
174. Examples of this can be seen in common law and statutory criminal trespass laws
including common law theft, burglary, breaking and entering, voyeurism, criminal assault and
battery, sexual assault and battery, and rape. Also civil liability exists for issues of intentional
torts such as trespass, trespass to chattels, conversion, assault, battery, and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Including intentional infliction of emotional distress is important because
a cause of action shall exist if a secretly obtained image is distributed, absent the knowledge and
consent of the recorded person, and the distribution creates such a traumatic event in the
recorded person that mental damages are present and the secret, unconsented and unknown
recording is deemed sufficiently "outrageous" by common law standards. All of these common
law and statutory enactments create with them an implicit privacy interest in one's person,
home, and/or possessions. Lastly, it is important to note that all natural persons have a
fundamental right to privacy, "to be let alone," as protected by article I, section 23 of the Florida
Constitution. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
175. Gail Schiller, Lifetime's Tale of Video Voyeur Spurs U.S. Law, HOLLYWOOD REP.,
Dec. 28, 2004, at 5; Jury Awards $476,200, supra note 123.
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Thanksgiving. The family takes the turnpike from South Florida to
North Florida. During this trip, the family's minor child exclaims that
he needs to use the restroom. Does this sound familiar? Then imagine
the parents deciding whether to use the restroom or not because there
might be a recording device videotaping their minor child, or even
themselves, disrobing! Would this not cause pause for families who
wish to travel across Florida? Families might also seek alternative
means for their minor children to use the restroom (possibly stopping on
the side of the road to have their minor child relieve his or her bodily
urges). This would cause safety risks as people would still be driving on
the highway at fifty or more miles per hour while the family's car is on
the side of the road. Additionally, the family could be standing outside
of the car, and any wrong turn could result in a fatality.
Society's risks far outweigh an individual's ability to enforce section
810.145. An outrageous amount of harm would occur if secret image
recordings are freely distributed across the internet. Individuals could be
damaged by having their private sexual organs unknowingly exposed to
an online audience of potentially millions of viewers. Furthermore, it
would be very difficult for these harmed individuals to investigate how
they were secretly recorded. In addition, it would not be easy to
discover the video voyeurs behind these crimes. If law enforcement is
unable to locate these criminals, then individuals would be forced to
hire private investigators to seek justice. The burden to individuals
would be financially crippling and society's cost would be extreme.
Here, the state is compelled to act.
But is section 810.145 so narrowly tailored as to be the least
restrictive means for Florida to protect any person within its jurisdiction
that is victimized by video voyeurism? A device that triggers section
810.145 is an "imaging device" statutorily defined as "any mechanical,
digital, or electronic viewing device; still camera; camcorder; motion
picture camera; or any other instrument, equipment, or format capable
of recording, storing, or transmitting visual images of another
person."' 176 The use of these devices in a forbidden way is what is being
regulated, not the creation of the device. To regulate the creation or
distribution of these devices would create a much greater burden on the
state and its economy that neither can bear, especially with the advent of
devices
ways
so many new and innovative
179
178 to record images through
177
the digital
the iPad,
the camera phone,
such as the iPhone,
176.

FLA. STAT. § 810.145(1)(b).

177. HD Video Recording 1080p HD, To Be Perfectly Clear, APPLE.COM,
http://www.apple.com/iphone/features/hd-video-recording.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
178. Your New Favorite Way to Do Just About Everything, APPLE.COM, http://www.apple.
corn/ipad/built-in-apps/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
179. Droid X by Motorola, MOTOROLA.COM, http://www.motorola.com/Consumers/US-
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camera, 80 and any other little gadget that runs on batteries where a
person can take a snap shot of what he or she is presently viewing.
Therefore, regulating the use of these devices is likely the least
restrictive manner to approach this element.
The statutory language, creating the specific intent crime of video
voyeurism, is sufficiently limited to situations where a victim is harmed
because it places the entirety of whether this crime exists on the
subjective mind of the victim. If the victim has demonstrated both
knowledge and offered consent to the person recording a forbidden
image, then the social harm is no longer at issue because there is no
victim. This ties the purpose, knowledge and consent, and secrecy
elements all into one bundle for the purpose of the narrowly tailored
strict scrutiny test. The state here is compelled to act only if all elements
are met. There is probably no way in which the state can regulate this
behavior in a means less restrictive than to put all the power of whether
the defendant should be prosecuted in the hands of the victim.
Merchants and individuals with private security surveillance
equipment are protected from prosecution so long as a conspicuously
posted notice is available on the premises under which the "secret"
recording may result, because these categories of persons are not
harmed."" Lastly, the protections detailed in the statute explain that
even if a "conspicuously posted" notice does not exist, no violation
shall occur
if the recording device itself is "clearly and immediately
1 82
obvious."
Therefore, even under the strict scrutiny standard, the constitutional
demands of being in line with the First Amendment. This includes the
blanket exception for law enforcement officers performing surveillance
duties pursuant to a lawful duty to investigate as long as they do not
violate the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, section 12, of the Florida
Constitution. 183 In closing, the First Amendment shall not prove section
810.145 unconstitutional. This includes both the actual secret image
recordings, and the distribution of the forbidden images, because
knowledge and consent of the victim are requirements of the statute.

EN/Consumer-Product-and-Services/Mobile-Phones/Motorola-DROID-X-US-EN
(last visited
Mar. 3, 2012).
180. Compact Digital Cameras, NIKON.COM, http://www.nikonusa.com/Nikon-Products/
Compact-Digital-Cameras/index.page (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
181. See FLA. STAT. § 810.145(5)(b).

182.
183.

Id. § 810.145(5)(c).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; FLA. STAT. § 810.145(5)(a).
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d. Section 810.145 Is Not Facially Overbroad1

A defendant might argue that because photographs and images of
persons putting on clothes, taking off clothes, or revealing their bodies
will be unconstitutionally censored, that the statute is facially
overbroad. A regulation is unconstitutionally overbroad if its broad
sweep encompasses protected speech activities and chills First
Amendment rights of persons, not before the courts, to such an extent
that the entire law must be struck down. 185 A regulation is facially
overbroad only if it is substantially overbroad. 186 To be substantially
overbroad does not mean that there are a handful of circumstances in
which its application would be unconstitutional. 187 Instead, the
regulation must pose a realistic danger that will significantly
compromise recognized First Amendment protections of parties not
before the courts. 188 This is the reason for the standing exception for the
overbreadth doctrine. 189 Under this rule, standing is not required if a
party challenges a law as being facially overbroad. 90 The more
situations in which a regulation prohibits constitutionally protected
speech, the greater the likelihood the regulation is facially overbroad. 19 1
The question is whether a more narrowly tailored regulation would
adequately achieve the state's goal without compromising

184. Just because the statute itself is not facially overbroad, does not mean that the statute
could not be overbroad as applied to the specific facts of a particular defendant. Due to the
numerous situations in which this can exist, and the fact that Alice's situation does not itself
contain an overbroad as applied issue, that analysis is beyond the scope of this Note and shall
not be discussed. Suffice it to say that if a Florida court finds that the statute is overbroad as
applied to an individual case, then stare decisis would dictate that the construction of the statute
shall not include that particular set of facts as criminal. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 615-16 (1973).
185. Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 634 (1980) ("Given a case
or controversy, a litigant whose own activities are unprotected may nevertheless challenge a
statute by showing that it substantially abridges the First Amendment rights of other parties not
before the court.").
186. Id.
187. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612.
188. Id. at 615.
189. Id. at 612 ("Litigants, therefore are permitted to challenge a statute not because their
own rights of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or assumption
that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression.").
190. Id.
191. See id. at 615; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 770-71 (1982) (finding
that in the absence of a substantial showing of regulating constitutionally protected speech,
overbreadth will not protect a person who violates a statute unless the overbreadth applies to the
facts of the defendant's case).
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constitutionally
protected rights that create a chilling effect of self92
1
censorship.
Here, the recording of images is not considered speech. Therefore,
the recording portion of section 810.145 of the Florida Statutes cannot
be found unconstitutional under the overbreadth doctrine. The
distribution portion of section 810.145 can arguably be considered
speech as earlier mentioned. An example exists when the press acquires
images obtained pursuant to the statute. These images, say of famous
actors in various states of undress, can be of great value to certain media
merely because of their demand. At this point, 93
these images may
become a form of expression on behalf of the press.1
The question that next arises is does this statute stifle a substantial
amount of speech if it were to prevent the media from distributing these
images? The answer comes in two packages. First, if a secretly recorded
image is obtained illegally, that is, from within the actor's home or in a
public area where the recorded person had a reasonable expectation of
privacy, say in a restroom or a fitting room, and the actor did not have
knowledge nor provide the recorder with consent for the recording, then
the image cannot be distributed because, as earlier described, the test
meets strict scrutiny. 94 Second, those individual images recorded from
the street or public areas by the press are constitutionally protected. But
because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy for a person who
leaves his or her window blinds open from the state, and certainly not
from the public, the courts will likely construe the statute so as to avoid
the overbreadth challenge.
The application of "reasonable expectation of privacy" cannot
include areas commonly viewable from the public. Why? Because the
"victim" should know that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
if he or she undresses in his or her home with the blinds open. For these
reasons, section 810.145 is not facially overbroad. For those individual
circumstances where the courts determine that the statute is overbroad
as applied, then stare decisis will create exceptions that will likely be
added as amendments to the statute in the years to come.

192.

Sec'y of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 957 (1984) ("[W]here the

claim is that a statute is overly broad in violation of the First Amendment, the Court has allowed
a party to assert the rights of another without regard to the ability of the other to assert his own
claims and with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own
conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity."

(emphasis added) (citations omitted)); see also Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444
U.S. 620, 634 (1980).
193. See generally Harvard Law Review Association, Privacy Photography, and the
Press, 111 HARv. L. REV. 1086 (1998).

194. See supra Part II.E.2.c (discussing strict scrutiny and how this statute is narrowly
tailored to meet Florida's compelling state interest to protect victims from secret video voyeurs).
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IV. BACK TO ALICE
"The time has come, " the Walrus said, "To talk of many things:
Of shoes-andships-andsealing wax-[oif cabbages-andkings-1
And why the sea is boiling hot-[a]ndwhether pigs have wings....
A. Walrus: Cruel Results for the Victim
Now think back to Alice and her present situation. She presented the
police department with a recording made by a person that did not have
her knowledge and consent. Alice, having not seen the imaging device
before, during, or after her encounter, is evidence that the image was
taken secretly. She was in a private bedroom of the man she was having
sexual relations with, windows curtains closed, so there was likely a
reasonable expectation of privacy.
The recording showed her disrobing and revealing her breasts,
buttocks, and her pubic area. Even though the man's private genitals
were shown as well, because he knew and consented to the recording, as
indicated by his winking at the camera, then images of himself are not
protected under section 810.145 of the Florida Statutes. But, the man
winking at the camera indicates awareness of the imaging device and
because Alice did not show awareness of the camera, then this is
probative of secrecy on behalf of the recorder. This also counts as a
factor as to whether the imaging device was secretly installed by the
man who was winking. After all, why wink if you do not know the
device is there and recording? Lastly, the image was distributed because
a friend of Alice provided her with a copy of it. In this case, the
recording itself provides a great deal of evidence that makes the act of
recording a violation of section 810.145(2).
The witness who provided Alice with the recording can also help
lead to the source of the distribution. Was the image taken by someone
without knowledge and consent of the recorder? Or was it actually
distributed? The end result is that, even if the image was stolen,
whoever distributed the image is likely guilty of distribution under this
statute. "Knowing or having reason to believe," that the recording was
taken in this manner is sufficient.' 96 The proof is going to be harder,
195. CARROLL, supra note 6, at 185. Walrus used his handkerchief to wipe away his tears.
Id. at 187. Yet all the time, he ate the Oysters absent any fear. Id.at 188. Tricking Carpenter
with sobs was his goal that day. Id. Do you see the pretext in the tears as he slobbered up his
prey? Id.Alice, finding herself confronted with deceit, shows repulsion and rejects the Walrus's
sneaky ways. Id.At this point, Florida's laws are only repulsed by the victimizers should they
become revealed. Alice must find the culprit for justice. If she cannot, then the rest of Floridians
must.
196. FLA. STAT. § 810.145(3) (2011).
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however, if the image was stolen or distributed by someone that did not
know the image was secretly recorded. The distributor must know, or
must have a reasonable belief, that the image was taken secretly without
knowledge and consent of the recorded victim.' 97 If the image itself
does not provide a basis for this reasonable belief, then additional proof
must be presented against a distributor that unknowingly distributed this
image.
Actual knowledge of a distributor, that an image was secretly
recorded without knowledge and consent of the recorded victim,
obviously meets the notice element in section 810.145(3).98 The notice
element may also be met if the distributor does not have actual
knowledge but suspects that the image was secretly recorded without
knowledge and consent of the recorded victim.199 If the circumstances
surrounding the image make its origin suspicious, then the distributor
will probably be put on notice, triggering the notice element. In other
words, if the distributor suspects that the recorded victim is dressing,
disrobing, or revealing his or her body without knowing that he or she is
being recorded, or if the image was an up skirt, or through the clothing,
photograph, then the holder of the image should be deemed to have
notice. Accordingly, a distributor would have reason to believe that the
origins of such images are in violation of section 810.145.
Thus, as earlier noted, Alice is lucky. She has enough proof to at
least begin her investigation that will likely lead to at least one arrest
and possibly a conviction of a criminal. Nevertheless, most victims of
video voyeurism do not know that they are victims at all. Why? Because
if the image was recorded secretly, then how can the victim report the
crime? The victim would need to know. Or like the case of Wilson v.
State, a third party would have to report the crime. But because this
crime requires that the recorded image be secret, the results for victims
are rather cruel. They will remain victims, ignorant victims, of a crime
committed against them where their images are used for the
"amusement, sexual arousal, entertainment, gratification, or profit" of
another at their expense.20 0
B. Through the Looking Glass: Florida's Futureand Technology
As technology continues to evolve, so too does Florida's future.
Persons looking to find a safe way to record images to protect their
property are protected so long as they provide notice to those that enter

197. Id.
198.

See id.

199. See id.
200. Id. § 810.145(2).
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their property. 2 Also, by not hiding their cameras, recorded images are
protected in section 810.145 of the Florida Statutes. 20 2 Also, images
taken by persons in public are not protected, unless the image is taken
through the clothing or underneath the clothing.20 3 With imaging
devices being attached to almost every communication gadget currently
being created, and as society becomes more and more dependent on this
technology, Florida's law enforcement and legislators need to be more
vigilant. Why? Without being careful, our society can find itself
enslaved to private violators of persons' privacy interests. In a state that
prides itself on protecting privacy as seen in the Florida Constitution, it
is important that Floridians do not lose sight of what is important.
Our person, our flesh, our private reproductive organs, and our
sexual encounters that we choose to participate in are no one's business
but our own. Should we as a society lose sight of that, then we will
become a society that tolerates peeping toms who would then dictate
how we live our lives. A state like Florida that depends on tourism may
find itself shunning guests away. People visit Florida for a good time,
and if they find their good time becoming the source of another's
amusement, entertainment, sexual arousal, gratification, or profit, then it
is very unlikely that they return to our state.
Living life constantly looking over our shoulder and afraid that our
every move is being recorded, is like living in some clich6 conspiracy
movie. But the reality of life is much more terrifying than the fiction of
a movie. People can use images like these to extort and black mail,
humiliate, degrade, and even destroy relationships. The law must do its
best to keep up with the pace of technology, or else, we will end up in a
society filled with victims of video voyeurism.

V. CONCLUSION

Do you hear the snow against the window-panes, Kitty? How
nice and soft it sounds! Just as if someone was kissing the
window all over outside. I wonder if the snow loves the trees and
fields, that it kisses them so gently? And then it covers them up
snug, you know, with a white quilt .... 2 04

201.

Id. § 810.145(5)(c).

202. Id. § 810.145(5)(b).
203. Id. § 810.145(2)(c).
204. CARROLL, supra note 6, at 140. So Alice finds herself speaking with Dinah, her cat.
Id. Much like the softness of snow, she needs the comfort of the pure white quilt of ignorance,
but instead finds herself in the cold caress of the bitter knowledge that she is just another victim.
Unlike many others, however, she knows her status as a victim. Now Alice must look into the
Looking Glass and gaze into her future.
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Florida's law enforcement should focus more attention on educating
the public on the crime of video voyeurism. Floridians must become
more aware of their surroundings. Persons in Florida, guests or actual
Floridians, who observe these recordings, should notify the police
immediately. The only way they can know this is if Floridians are
trained to keep an eye out for crimes committed by video voyeurs.
Although the cost of training people becomes one where criminals may
become more aware of how video voyeurism can be done, the crime is
already happening and must be better prevented. Technology makes it
incredibly easy, and so long as persons have an interest in being
amused, gratified, entertained, sexually aroused, or profited from secret
images of victims, there will be an increasing demand to stop video
voyeurism crimes from happening. Therefore, Floridians need to
become more aware, more informed, and more careful when in public,
including those places where they have a reasonable expectation of
privacy.

